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President Caron and Professor Hunter, distinguished scholars and 
practitioners, members of the American Society of International 
Law, ladies and gentlemen,  
It is great honour for me to have been invited to deliver the 
Fourteenth Annual Grotius Lecture at the invitation of the American 
Society of International Law and the International Legal Studies 
Program of American University Washington College of Law. It is 
likewise a great pleasure to be speaking before the annual meeting of 
the American Society of International Law, which has for so many 
decades been dedicated to enabling open and creative discussions of 
the outstanding legal issues of the day. It must be admitted, however, 
that addressing the opening of an ASIL meeting entitled 
“Confronting Complexity” presents a great challenge, for the general 
theme seems to aptly encapsulate both the times we live in, which 
are undoubtedly complex, and calls on me to try to outline how we 
might deal with complexity.  
It should come as no surprise that my remarks will primarily focus 
on the role of the law in confronting the complexity of violence, and 
particularly the role of international humanitarian law in confronting 
the complexity of armed conflict. It is fitting, in this context, to pay 
tribute to Hugo Grotius. In line with principles established by his 
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Spanish and Italian intellectual counterparts Francisco de Vitoria and 
Alberico Gentili, he laid the foundations of international law, and in 
his timeless treatise On the Law of War and Peace determined that 
certain rules govern the conduct of war whatever the justness of its 
cause. We are far beyond the writings of Grotius today in terms of 
the elaborateness of the international legal framework, including the 
one governing armed conflict, yet we remain in his debt. He not only 
paved the way to our current thinking but showed us that complexity 
may—and can only be—addressed with reason, vision, and 
humanity.  
What does complexity mean when armed conflict is the reference 
point for analysis? It means, first of all, that armed conflicts remain a 
tragic reality in the twenty-first century and that enormous human 
suffering continues to be caused by this form of violence. We are all 
witness to continued violations of international humanitarian law, 
including deliberate attacks against civilians, the destruction of 
infrastructure vital to the civilian population, the forcible 
displacement of entire communities from their habitual places of 
residence, and various forms of sexual violence inflicted against 
vulnerable individuals and groups. Persons deprived of liberty in 
armed conflict are likewise frequently subject to appalling behaviour 
by their captors, including murder, torture and other forms of ill-
treatment, deprivation of humane conditions of detention, and denial 
of procedural safeguards and fair trial rights. Medical personnel and 
humanitarian workers are also an increased target of attacks. The law 
tries to prevent or put a stop to suffering and to deter future 
violations, but it cannot, by itself, eradicate abuses or be expected to 
do so.  
Complexity may also be approached by examining the features of 
current armed conflicts and the political, economic, and social 
backdrop against which they take place—all issues which are beyond 
the scope of my remarks. Allow me, nevertheless, to note that the 
International Committee of the Red Cross, which has operations in 
some eighty contexts around the world, is involved in a range of 
situations: from those in which the most advanced technology and 
weapons systems are deployed in asymmetric confrontations, to an 
assortment of armed conflicts typified by low technology and high 
fragmentation of the actors involved. Each case must be approached 
on the particular facts and a humanitarian response devised to meet 
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the specific needs of those most affected, which is by no means a 
simple endeavour.  
Increased complexity is also a feature of contemporary armed 
conflicts, the nature of which continues to evolve. The predominant 
form of armed conflict nowadays is non-international, often 
stemming from state weakness that leaves room for armed groups to 
take matters into their own hands based on—real or perceived—
political, ethnic, or religious grievances. Some non-international 
armed conflicts are predominantly economically driven and revolve 
around struggles for access to key natural resources. Whatever the 
case, non-state armed groups tend to live off the civilian population 
and engage in appalling acts of brutality to ensure control, instil fear, 
and obtain new recruits. They frequently resort to looting and 
trafficking, extortion and kidnapping, as well as other acts amounting 
to profitable economic strategies that are sustained by the general 
lawlessness and by national, regional, and international economic 
and political interests. Thus, the coexistence of violence stemming 
from armed conflict and that linked to various forms of banditry and 
the blurring of lines between armed conflict and crime, including 
transnational, has become a complex reality defying easy practical or 
legal solutions.  
The world is further beset by the combined effects of political, 
economic, and financial crises. Food prices continue to rise, affecting 
countless people already suffering from the effects of armed conflict. 
These trends, when compounded with the ravages of natural 
disasters, including drought and floods, are likely to continue to fuel 
unrest and armed conflicts in the years ahead.  
Some of these characteristics are also present in situations of 
violence below the threshold of armed conflict, including instances 
of state repression, inter-communal strife, and urban violence. The 
humanitarian needs in these contexts may be just as grave as in 
situations of armed conflict. The ICRC relies on its right of 
humanitarian initiative provided by the Statutes of the International 
Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement to come to the aid of persons 
or communities in need when, among other things, its operational 
involvement is assessed as being of added value.  
The very brief outline of current trends in armed conflict and other 
situations of violence begs the question of whether reality is really 
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becoming increasingly complex or whether, thanks to technology 
and new means of communication, we have more facts at our 
disposal. I will not attempt to answer it because the more important 
question, in my view, is: how do we use international law to address 
complexity, whether it is indeed increasing or is just perceived to be 
that. Based on historical observation and on an analysis of events 
over the past decade, I would submit that states and other actors have 
given essentially three responses.  
When faced with impending or actual crises, domestic and 
international institutions have sometimes chosen to abstain from 
action. An obvious and tragic example was the inability of states to 
finalize a convention on the protection of civilians ahead of the 
Second World War, which contributed to the unspeakable 
consequences that we are all familiar with. On other occasions, the 
real or perceived complexity of a domestic or international crisis has 
led states to claim that existing law is not suited to the new 
circumstances at hand, resulting in the wholesale or partial rejection 
of longstanding and well-established precepts. This approach, when 
the legal framework in question is IHL, has the effect of depriving of 
protection the very persons it was designed to apply to. We are also 
familiar with the consequences of this option. A third approach, 
fortunately the most common, has been to uphold existing law in the 
face of new challenges, whether real or perceived, and to analyze 
that which is possibly new with a view to devising appropriate 
solutions. Over the course of the last years, this has also been the 
ICRC’s approach. The organization has tried to understand and 
assess the reality of contemporary armed conflicts and to propose 
answers to some of the salient questions without departing from the 
balance underlying IHL, which is that between military necessity and 
the imperative of humanity.  
Allow me to briefly touch upon another issue affecting the ability 
to resolve complexity through law, which is the relationship between 
international and domestic law. To begin with, the universality of a 
given norm may be hampered by the fact that a state may choose not 
to become a party to an international treaty. This may happen even if 
it took part in the negotiating process and obtained concessions from 
the other participants, with the implicit expectation that such 
accommodations will facilitate its signature and ratification. A state 
may also sign a treaty, but eventually not ratify or accede to it for a 
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variety of reasons, including domestic political considerations. While 
a state in this case may not act contrary to the treaty’s object and 
purpose, it is nevertheless not bound by it. Even when states do agree 
on the content of a treaty and agree to be bound by it at the 
international level, implementation in a domestic legal system 
oftentimes remains uncertain, particularly if a treaty needs to be 
previously incorporated by means of domestic law. Thus, a key legal 
requirement at the national level may be missing.  
A further and important cause of complexity is the way in which 
domestic courts approach and interpret international norms. Some 
courts ensure that a state complies with its international obligations, 
while others may choose to disregard international law. Approaches 
to customary international law and its acceptance by domestic courts 
also vary widely. This creates particular uncertainty in the area of 
international humanitarian law, which was initially customary law 
based, and in which customary law rules still constitute an important 
source of legal obligations. If customary law is disregarded, then the 
minimum safeguards provided for in IHL will not be implemented.  
I do not, of course, have a solution to the complexity arising from 
the interplay of international and domestic law. I simply want to note 
that the uneven application of international law at the domestic level 
may give rise to the justified perception that international law cannot 
ensure consistent and equal outcomes when its rules are violated. In 
the IHL context this means, for example, that, depending on the 
operation of the variables I have outlined above, persons suspected 
of war crimes will in some cases be brought to justice, while others 
will escape it. States and other actors are thus called on to do their 
utmost to ensure that IHL performs its protective function in any 
situation in which it is legally binding. Applying it in good faith is 
always an indispensable starting point.  
Ladies and gentlemen,  
I would now like to turn to certain practical challenges related to 
situations of armed conflict and offer some remarks on how 
international humanitarian law may be used to address them. The 
topics are by no means exhaustive and include the classification of 
armed conflicts, the rules on detention related to armed conflict, the 
need to improve compliance with IHL, and the role of IHL in the 
face of new technologies of warfare. In some cases, we have the 
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advantage of hindsight. Other challenges are ongoing. Others are 
developing.  
A key legal issue that has been, and is being, debated is whether 
the current IHL dichotomy—under which armed conflicts are 
classified either as international or non-international—is sufficient to 
deal with new factual scenarios, and whether new conflict 
classifications are needed. The question has arisen mainly because of 
the undoubted increase in non-international armed conflicts with an 
extraterritorial element. A typology of such conflicts has been 
outlined in the ICRC’s recent Report to the 31st International 
Conference of Red Cross and Red Crescent, entitled IHL and the 
Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts.  
One example is a non-international armed conflict originating 
within the territory of a single state between government armed 
forces and one or more organized armed groups that has “spilled 
over” into the territory of a neighbouring state. Another example is a 
non-international armed conflict in which multinational armed forces 
are fighting alongside the armed forces of a “host” state—in its 
territory—against one or more organized armed groups. As the 
armed conflict does not oppose two or more states (i.e., as all the 
state actors are on the same side), the conflict is classified as non-
international, regardless of the international component. An 
illustration of this type is the non-international armed conflict in 
Afghanistan. It may also be argued that a “cross-border” non-
international armed conflict exists, possibly alongside an 
international armed conflict, when the forces of a state are engaged 
in hostilities with a non-state party operating from the territory of a 
neighbouring state without that state’s control or support.  
Yet another type of non-international armed conflict, believed by 
some to exist, is the one between Al Qaeda and “associated forces” 
and the United States, most often called “transnational.” It should be 
recalled that the ICRC does not share the view that a conflict of such 
scope, previously known as the “war against terrorism,” is taking 
place. Since the horrific attacks of September 11th 2001, the ICRC 
has referred to a multifaceted “fight against terrorism.” This effort 
involves a variety of counter-terrorism measures on a spectrum that 
starts with non-violent responses—such as intelligence gathering, 
financial sanctions, judicial cooperation, and others—and includes 
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the use of armed force at the other end. When armed force is used, 
the ICRC has taken a case-by-case approach to legally analyzing and 
classifying the various situations of violence that ensue. Some have 
been classified as international armed conflicts, others as non-
international armed conflicts, while various acts of terrorism taking 
place in the world have been assessed as being outside any armed 
conflict. IHL rules governing the use of force and detention for 
security reasons are less restrictive than the rules applicable outside 
of armed conflicts governed by other bodies of international law, and 
IHL should thus not be applied to situations that do not amount to 
armed conflict.  
It should be recalled that the key distinction between an 
international and a non-international armed conflict is the quality of 
the parties involved: while an international conflict presupposes the 
use of armed force between two or more states, a non-international 
conflict involves hostilities between a state and an organized non-
state armed group or between such groups themselves. If one surveys 
armed conflicts going on in the world, there does not appear to be 
any current situation that would not fall into one of the two existing 
conflict classifications. Moreover, to the extent that new 
classifications have been called for, they would invariably result in a 
dilution of existing IHL protections, an outcome which the ICRC 
could not support, for obvious reasons.  
IHL rules governing detention in armed conflict have also been the 
subject of much controversy over the past few years. While the 
relevant rules of the Third and Fourth Geneva Convention may be 
said to have withstood the test of time in international armed 
conflicts, recent practice has demonstrated that IHL governing 
detention in non-international armed conflict needs to be upgraded. 
Based on its operational activities, the ICRC has identified specific 
humanitarian concerns related to deprivation of liberty in this type of 
conflict, some of which are not, or are not sufficiently, addressed by 
international humanitarian law. 
The first concern is poor material conditions of detention, which 
may, and often do, have direct and irreversible consequences on the 
physical and mental health of detainees. Detention conditions for 
persons under the control of a non-governmental armed group are 
oftentimes nothing less than dire, owing to lack of resources and 
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organization. Poor material conditions of detention commonly mean 
lack of adequate food, water, and clothing, as well as insufficient 
medical care. Detention facilities themselves are frequently 
unsuitable. Detainees often have limited contact with their families 
and are sometimes prohibited to see them even though family contact 
is both a legal obligation and constitutes sound detention policy. 
There is likewise a failure to register detainees, or to separate the 
different categories one from the other, or to allow detainees to 
practice their religion. Last but not least, overcrowding is a 
permanent characteristic of many places of detention. While 
objective circumstances are in some cases the cause, in many others 
inefficient or non-existent legal processes unnecessarily prolong 
detention or even prevent release.  
While IHL contains detailed rules on conditions of detention in 
international armed conflicts, this is not the case in conflicts not of 
an international character, especially those governed by Article 3 
common to the Geneva Conventions. Additional Protocol II provides 
an essential set of rules, but they are not sufficiently comprehensive, 
and the relevant norms of customary IHL are necessarily formulated 
in general terms.  
In addition to the general protection applicable to all persons 
detained for reasons related to a non-international armed conflict, 
further provisions are necessary to address the specific needs of 
certain categories of persons. The situation of women, for instance, 
requires special attention. Children should also be better protected, 
and the needs of other categories of persons, such as the elderly and 
the disabled, should likewise be reflected in IHL governing non-
international armed conflicts.  
A particular humanitarian concern related to detention in non-
international armed conflict is the lack of procedural safeguards for 
persons subject to internment. As already mentioned, most conflicts 
nowadays are non-international, and internment is widely practiced. 
In the absence of IHL norms, states often resort to policy directives 
or apply domestic law, neither of which has proven to be satisfactory 
from a protection standpoint. In practice, internees are not adequately 
informed of the reasons for their internment, and an established 
process allowing them to challenge the lawfulness of their detention 
and to obtain release if the reasons do not or no longer exist is 
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lacking. Regular, six-monthly periodic review is also missing. 
Uncertainty about one’s legal situation is often compounded by 
prohibitions or restrictions on contact with the outside world, 
including families, leading to tensions within detention facilities that 
could be avoided.  
Let me insert a bracket here and note the increasingly widespread 
use of the term “indefinite detention” as being synonymous with 
“law of war” detention. This is very unfortunate, as it may serve to 
create a perception of acceptability where none should exist. With 
the exception of prisoner-of-war internment in international armed 
conflict, the internment of any other person for imperative reasons of 
security in international armed conflict must end as soon as the 
reasons justifying it cease to exist. The same rule should be applied 
by analogy to internment in non-international armed conflicts. Initial 
and periodic review processes are provided for precisely because 
there is no assumption that a person will automatically constitute an 
imperative security threat until the end of an armed conflict. Each 
case has to be examined initially on the merits, and periodically 
thereafter, to assess whether the threat level posed remains the same. 
In view of the rapid progression of events in armed conflict, the 
assessment may, and in most cases does, change. There is also the 
outer temporal limit of internment, which is the close of active 
hostilities. Thus, to somehow imply that IHL allows indefinite 
detention as such risks misrepresenting the spirit and letter of this 
body of rules.  
The reality and the urgency of the humanitarian problem caused 
by lack of procedural safeguards for internment in non-international 
armed conflicts is, to us, evident. Whether internment takes place in 
a state’s own territory or is undertaken by states engaged abroad as 
part of a multinational coalition with a “host” state’s consent, the 
absence of binding IHL rules has allowed divergent approaches to 
ensuring the procedural rights of internees. Customary IHL prohibits 
arbitrary deprivation of liberty but does not provide criteria for 
determining what is “arbitrary.” Article 3 common to the Geneva 
Conventions contains no provisions regulating internment, apart 
from the requirement of humane treatment. Additional Protocol II 
mentions internment in Articles 5 and 6 respectively but likewise 
does not give details on how it is to be organized. In order to provide 
guidance to its delegations for their operational dialogue with states 
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and non-state armed groups, in 2005 the ICRC adopted an 
institutional position on procedural safeguards for internment. That 
position has served as a basis for bilateral discussions in a range of 
contexts in which internment for security reasons is being practiced 
and is believed to present a workable starting point for examining the 
key legal issues that arise. 
The transfer of persons between states has also emerged as one of 
the defining features of armed conflicts over the past several years, 
particularly in situations where multinational forces transfer persons 
to a “host” state, to their country of origin, or to a third state. There is 
cause for concern from a humanitarian standpoint whenever there is 
a risk that a transferred person may be subject to serious violations, 
such as arbitrary deprivation of life, torture, and other forms of ill-
treatment or persecution upon transfer.  
The ICRC’s focus on the issue of transfers has arisen as a result of, 
broadly speaking, two operational situations. First, when persons it 
visits express concern that they will be at risk of violations upon 
transfer to the receiving state. Second, as a result of visits to persons 
who have been transferred, during which the ICRC observes that 
transferees have been subjected to prohibited treatment. The general 
international law principle prohibiting transfers to situations of 
abuse, known as non-refoulement, is not, however, explicitly 
provided for in IHL governing non-international armed conflicts. 
The lack of legal provisions suggests that it would be advisable to 
provide for a set of workable substantive and procedural rules that 
would both guide the action of states and non-state armed groups and 
protect the rights of affected persons. Current practice, in which 
more and more non-international armed conflicts involve coalitions 
of states fighting one or more non-governmental armed groups in a 
“host” country, indicates that uncertainty about how to organize a 
lawful transfer regime, including with regard to post-transfer 
responsibilities, is likely to increase, rather than decrease. 
These and other issues—including the need to ensure ICRC access 
to persons detained in non-international armed conflicts—were the 
subject of an internal ICRC study and then a Report to the 31st 
International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent entitled 
Strengthening Legal Protection for Victims of Armed Conflicts. A 
Conference resolution of the same name invited the ICRC to pursue 
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further research, consultation, and discussion in cooperation with 
states in order to identify and propose a range of options on how to 
ensure that IHL remains relevant in protecting persons deprived of 
their liberty in relation to armed conflict. 
The other issue that the ICRC was similarly invited to work on by 
the Conference is enhancing and ensuring the effectiveness of IHL 
compliance mechanisms. This is a humanitarian imperative that must 
be addressed, because lack of respect for IHL remains, as I have 
noted above, the primary reason for enormous human suffering in 
armed conflicts.  
Special emphasis has been placed in the past two decades, in 
particular, on developing mechanisms to ensure individual criminal 
responsibility for crimes under international law, including war 
crimes. States have enacted and implemented domestic legislation 
enabling them to prosecute perpetrators. The establishment of 
international criminal tribunals and the International Criminal Court 
are also invaluable steps in the effort to combat impunity. The Rome 
Statute provides a list of war crimes, including those that may be 
committed in non-international armed conflicts. However, although 
significant, these measures are not, by themselves, sufficient. The 
punishment of war criminals takes place once atrocities have been 
committed, which is often years after the events, while victims’ 
needs are immediate and require mechanisms that are available to 
prevent violations and to halt them during armed conflict.  
It has not been possible to meet this need with the machinery 
provided for in the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I—
the system of Protecting Powers, the formal enquiry procedure, and 
the International Humanitarian Fact-Finding Commission. The 
Commission, in particular, has never been called upon to act, 
although it has been ready to do so since 1991. The main reason is 
that the actual operation of the existing mechanisms requires the 
consent of the parties concerned.  
In practice, it is mainly the ICRC that carries out certain 
supervisory tasks, such as visits to prisons, protection of the civilian 
population, confidential representations in the event of violations of 
humanitarian law, and so on. However, there are certain limits to the 
ICRC’s role that are inherent to its mission and working methods. It 
is not the ICRC’s policy to publicly condemn actors responsible for 
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violations of IHL. Except in strictly defined circumstances, the ICRC 
focuses on a confidential bilateral dialogue with the parties to a 
conflict, the purpose of which is to gain direct access to affected 
persons and to persuade the parties responsible for violations to 
change their behaviour and meet their obligations. Also, the ICRC 
does not necessarily have the formal authority to act in every case. In 
non-international armed conflicts, its ability to operate is subject to 
the consent of the parties involved through an offer of services. 
Fortunately, the offer is in most cases accepted.  
The mechanisms provided for in IHL are, admittedly, not the only 
ones that may be relied on to protect persons in time of armed 
conflict. The United Nations system has for many years been 
involved in monitoring behaviour in armed conflicts, in particular 
through the General Assembly, the Security Council, and the Human 
Rights Council. Although these mechanisms sometimes include the 
establishment of independent procedures (commissions of inquiry, 
special rapporteurs), final decisions are often subject to political 
negotiation. And while diplomatic channels are a necessary means 
for implementing international humanitarian law, they also have 
limits. First, it is not certain that these channels are really an 
alternative to IHL mechanisms. Indeed, violations persist in many 
cases despite monitoring by the UN bodies. What is more, given 
their political dimension, intergovernmental bodies tend to be 
selective. Their decisions are liable to be perceived as biased by an 
involved party, which poses a problem from the point of view of 
international humanitarian law. 
Regional mechanisms for protecting human rights have also 
helped meet the needs of victims of armed conflicts, particularly by 
ruling on individual complaints. The European and Inter-American 
human rights courts have made significant contributions to 
establishing justice, truth, and reparation, but they cannot 
compensate for the absence of a monitoring system specific to IHL. 
Their jurisdiction is limited to certain geographical zones, and their 
decisions are in principle based on the applicable human rights 
conventions rather than on IHL, which is a different branch of 
international. Very importantly, the jurisdiction of human rights 
bodies does not cover non-state armed groups because, in contrast to 
IHL, human rights law does not, as a rule, bind such groups. The 
practice of regional mechanisms for protecting human rights can 
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therefore not make up for the absence of a fully effective mechanism 
specific to humanitarian law. It is liable to call into question the 
primacy of international humanitarian law as the specific legal 
framework for protecting the victims of armed conflicts, and to 
weaken its universality and coherence. 
Thus, although the contribution of the United Nations and regional 
bodies must not be overlooked, the reality of contemporary armed 
conflicts demonstrates that the issue of sufficient and effective 
monitoring mechanisms has not yet been resolved. The question thus 
arises as to how the monitoring system established under IHL could 
be strengthened. Should the existing procedures (Protecting Powers, 
formal enquiry procedure, International Humanitarian Fact-Finding 
Commission) be modified with a view to ensuring that they operate 
effectively in all armed conflicts? Is it preferable to create new 
mechanisms that are better suited to contemporary realities? If so, 
what parameters should be taken into account to ensure that these 
mechanisms are effective? 
Many proposals have been put forward on the subject in the course 
of the normative history of international humanitarian law. When the 
Geneva Conventions were being drafted, it was proposed, for 
example, that a “High International Committee” be established, 
which would be in charge of monitoring the Conventions’ 
application. Some twenty years later, the UN Secretary-General 
suggested that an “Observer-General” or “Commissioner-General” 
be appointed who would be in charge of setting up and running a 
system of asylum or refuge for civilian populations affected by 
armed conflicts. When the 1977 Additional Protocols were being 
drafted, the ICRC also put forward several options, pointing to the 
potential role of existing international or regional organizations or 
suggesting that an ad hoc commission be set up. More recently, the 
UN Secretary-General also suggested, in his Millennium Summit 
report, that a mechanism be established for monitoring the 
application of the provisions of international humanitarian law by the 
parties to conflicts. Lastly, in 2003, the ICRC launched a wide-
ranging consultation process on the subject. The experts, including 
governmental, who were invited to take part mentioned the 
possibility of setting up one or several mechanisms that could carry 
out new functions to monitor respect for IHL: among them, a 
reporting system, an individual complaints mechanism, fact-finding 
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missions, and the quasi-judicial investigation of violations. 
These and other ideas related to IHL compliance mechanisms will 
be the subject of further examination and work that the ICRC intends 
to conduct with the Government of Switzerland, which has likewise 
undertaken to explore and identify concrete ways in which the 
application of IHL may be strengthened.  
Ladies and gentlemen, 
Before I draw to a close, allow me to briefly draw your attention to 
a developing issue that is causing some complexity in the legal field. 
I refer to the legal regulation of cyberspace and, more specifically, to 
the role of IHL in regulating what has become known as “cyber 
warfare,” the subject of much discussion nowadays.  
In recent years a wide array of new technologies has entered the 
modern battlefield. Cyberspace has opened up a potentially new war-
fighting domain, a man-made theatre of war additional to the natural 
theatres of land, air, sea, and outer space. It provides worldwide 
interconnectivity regardless of borders, which means that whatever 
has an interface with the Internet can be targeted from anywhere in 
the world. Interconnectivity also means that the effects of a cyber 
attack may have repercussions on various other systems, given that 
military networks are in many cases dependent on commercial 
infrastructure.  
The fact that a particular military activity is not specifically 
regulated does not mean that it can be used without restrictions. 
Means and methods of warfare which resort to cyber technology are 
subject to IHL just as any new weapon or delivery system has been 
so far. If a cyber operation is undertaken against an enemy in an 
armed conflict in order to cause damage, it can hardly be disputed 
that such an attack is in fact a method of warfare and is subject to 
prohibitions under IHL. 
Reconciling the emergence of cyberspace as a new war-fighting 
domain with the legal framework governing armed conflict is 
nevertheless a challenging task in several respects and requires 
careful reflection. A few issues being debated include:  
First, the digitalization on which cyberspace is built ensures 
anonymity and complicates the attribution of conduct. Thus, in most 
cases, it appears difficult if not impossible to identify the author of 
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an attack. Given that IHL relies on the attribution of responsibility to 
individuals and parties to conflicts, major difficulties arise. In 
particular, if the perpetrator of an operation and thus its link to an 
armed conflict cannot be identified, it is extremely difficult to 
determine whether IHL is even applicable.  
Second, there is no doubt that an armed conflict exists and IHL 
applies once traditional kinetic weapons are used in combination 
with cyber operations. However, a particularly difficult situation as 
regards the applicability of IHL arises when the first, or the only, 
“hostile” acts are conducted by means of a cyber operation. Can this 
be qualified as constituting an armed conflict within the meaning of 
the Geneva Conventions and other IHL treaties? Does it depend on 
the type of operation, that is, would the manipulation or deletion of 
data suffice, or is physical damage as the result of a manipulation 
required? It would appear that the answer to these questions will 
probably be determined in a definite manner only through future 
state practice. 
Third, the definition of the term “attack” is of decisive importance 
for the application of the various rules giving effect to the IHL 
principle of distinction. Additional Protocol I and customary IHL 
contain a specific definition of the term which is not identical to that 
provided for in other branches of law. Under Additional Protocol I, 
“attacks” means acts of violence against the adversary, whether in 
offence or defence. The term “acts of violence” denotes physical 
force. Based on that interpretation, which the ICRC shares, cyber 
operations by means of viruses, worms, etc. that result namely in 
physical damage to persons or damage to objects that goes beyond 
the computer program or data attacked could be qualified as “acts of 
violence” and therefore an attack in the sense of IHL.  
Fourth, when cyber operations constitute an attack, Additional 
Protocol I imposes the obligation to direct attacks only against 
“military objectives,” prohibits indiscriminate and disproportionate 
attacks, and imposes an obligation to take precautions in attack. 
These rules operate in the same way whether an attack is carried out 
by means of traditional weapons or by reliance on a computer 
network. Problems that arise in their application are therefore not 
necessarily unique to cyber operations, but many questions can be 
posed.  
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Based on what is publicly known about cyber operations thus far, 
ensuring compliance with the prohibition of indiscriminate attacks 
poses very serious challenges. One issue is whether cyber operations 
may be accurately aimed at an intended target and, even if so, 
whether indiscriminate effects upon civilian infrastructure could be 
prevented due to the interconnectedness of military and civilian 
computer networks. As regards the prohibition of disproportionate 
attacks, one of the queries is whether it is in practice possible to fully 
anticipate all the reverberating consequences/knock-on effects on 
civilians and civilian objects of an attack otherwise directed at a 
legitimate military objective.  
Respect for the principles of distinction and proportionality means 
that certain precautions in attack must be taken. Given that, in certain 
cases, cyber operations might actually cause less incidental harm to 
civilians or civilian objects than conventional weapons, it may be 
argued that the precautionary rule would require a commander to 
consider whether he or she could achieve the same military 
advantage by using cyber technology if practicable. 
I would like to reiterate that despite the newness of the technology 
and some of the issues just raised, IHL constraints do apply to means 
and methods of warfare which resort to cyber technology. Cyber 
warfare, like any other warfare, may only be conducted with respect 
for existing rules if the humanitarian goal of sparing civilians from 
suffering and preventing the destruction of civilian objects is to be 
preserved.  
Ladies and gentlemen,  
I would like to end my remarks by recalling something I noted at 
the beginning. Hugo Grotius’s work shows us that complexity may, 
and must be, addressed through law by the application of reason, 
vision, and humanity. Reason means, among other things of course, 
that the validity of existing international norms must be 
acknowledged and that the relevant rules must be implemented, until 
changes are agreed to. Any other approach risks unravelling the 
hard-won compromises that constitute international law and would 
jeopardize the baseline that states have established for resolving 
issues of common concern. In the area of international humanitarian 
law in particular, rejection or misinterpretation of the rules cannot be 
limited to one side only, as armed conflict by definition involves at 
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least two parties. If one of them changes the goal posts in the middle 
of an armed conflict, the other may do so as well, with immediate 
and tragic consequences for those whom IHL was designed to 
protect. Differently put, it should be borne in mind that hasty legal 
responses to new challenges often generate more, not less, 
complexity.  
An approach to international law, including IHL, based on vision 
means that there is a capacity and willingness to recognize and 
analyze what is new, and a readiness to effect change if necessary. In 
the area of international law, change is possible, and is most easily 
achieved, where states come together for the common good and are 
prepared to accommodate different views in the process of finding 
solutions. Resolving some of the challenges in the area of 
international humanitarian law that I have outlined above will 
undoubtedly require vision. The ICRC stands ready to assist states in 
this regard, based on the mandate entrusted to it by the parties to the 
treaties of international humanitarian law and the Statutes of the 
International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement.  
As for humanity, it is a broad concept that can be applied to many 
areas of human endeavour, including the law. It is the foundation 
stone of the entire edifice of IHL and must continue to permeate both 
the application of existing rules and the crafting of news ones, if 
deemed necessary. And, even though the principle defies precise 
legal definition, its observance in armed conflict always has 
immediate results: it helps save lives, protect the vulnerable, and 
prevent suffering. It is in fact necessary that the principle of 
humanity should remain just that, an overarching principle that 
informs the application, interpretation, and development of IHL. It is 
by its very nature an evolving concept that is given specific content 
in accordance with the values of the times. Our common challenge is 
to ensure that this complex notion keeps expanding.  
I thank you for your attention.  
 
